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This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Enterprise and 
Innovation.   
Abstract 
This paper investigates the internal versus external financing decisions among 
1900 early stage privately held UK firms in 1996-1997.  We study the factors 
that affect rejection rates in applications for outside finance among the different 
types of investors, taking into account the non-randomness in a firm’s decision 
to seek outside finance.  The data support the traditional pecking order theory; 
firms with greater capital expenditures / profits are more likely to seek finance 
and apply for more external finance.  The data further indicate growth oriented 
firms are much more likely to apply for external finance.  There are some 
differences in the internal versus external financing of female and male founder 
CEO firms, but these differences are largely attributable to growth orientation.  
Firms in industries with a greater proportion of larger competitors are less likely 
to obtain all of their desired outside capital.  The data also indicate banks are 
less likely to finance completely new startups, while venture capital funds are 
more likely to finance innovative and growth orientated firms.  Overall, the data 
do not indicate the presence of a capital gap in entrepreneurial finance; rather, 
firms seeking capital are able to secure their requisite financing from at least 
one of the many different available sources. 
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This paper engages two interrelated empirical questions.  First, what are the 
characteristics of privately held entrepreneurial firms that seek external 
[‘outside’] finance, and what drives the request for capital from the different 
potential sources of external finance: banks, venture capitalists, private 
individuals, leasing, factoring, suppliers/customers, partners/working 
shareholders, among other sources?  Second, what are the factors that lead to 
rejection or acceptance of requests for external finance, given this non-
randomness in the types of firms that seek external finance (in the spirit of 
Heckman, 1976, 1979)?   
 
It is widely recognized that the decision to seek external finance and the type of 
financing sought is related to information asymmetries faced by investors 
regarding the entrepreneurial firm’s quality (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).
1   Where entrepreneurs have information that investors do not have, 
external equity finance (which dilutes the entrepreneurs’ ownership share) is 
given unused debt capacity indicative of a low quality firm (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; see also Myers, 2000).  This stream of research has derived a standard 
pecking order theory, in that firms prefer to finance new projects with internal 
cash flows first, and then if necessary, thereafter seek external debt capital and 
lastly seek external equity capital.  This rank ordering, however, might be 
distorted by the fact that external sources of capital could add value to their 
investee firms.  For example, Garmaise (2000) shows that if investors are 
known to possess a greater ability to assess project quality relative to that of the 
entrepreneurial team, external equity finance is indicative of a high quality firm.  
Also De Meza and Webb (1987, 1992) argue that banks may not be ill informed 
relative to new firms and show that if we abandon the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
assumption of mean preserving spreads of risk then their rationing results do not 
hold (see also De Meza and Webb, 1999, 2000). In our paper, we test these 
theoretical propositions by first taking into account for preliminary question of 
what drives the decision of a firm to seek external financing.  We then 
empirically analyze the matching of different types of firms and investors, 
taking into account the non-randomness in the types of firms that sought outside 
capital.   
 
Our analysis builds on an important but largely segmented literature in financial 
intermediation and entrepreneurial finance (briefly surveyed in section 2).   
Academic studies of the interaction between firms and their sources of capital 
focus, almost exclusively, on a single source of capital.  Separate streams of 
literature have emerged in bank finance, lease finance, venture capital (VC) 




need to focus on one (or in exceptional cases, two) external capital sources is 
directly attributable to theoretical tractability (one cannot model everything).  In 
empirical work, the focus on one or two capital sources is largely attributable to 
data availability, since datasets are typically derived from investors, particularly 
in the case of non-publicly traded businesses. 
 
In building on this prior literature, the key component of our analysis is that we 
introduce a very large dataset derived from private entrepreneurial firms 
themselves, and not from their investors.  This empirical approach facilitates a 
number of advantages for the purpose of addressing the three central research 
questions outlined above.  Perhaps most importantly, because we observe firms 
that did and did not seek external finance, we avoid Heckman (1976, 1979) 
sample selection problems in analyzing the role of external investors in 
facilitating the development of entrepreneurial firms.  Prior work on topic (see 
section 2) is typically derived from one type of investor and thereby fails to 
consider the non-random selection process among those entrepreneurial firms 
that seek external finance, and the non-random selection process among 
different types of potential investors.   
 
A second key component of our analysis is that we have a very detailed and 
broad-based dataset from 1900 UK entrepreneurial firms in the period spanning 
1996-1997 the majority of which were formed in the 1980s and early 1990s 
(specific details are provided in section 4).  A number of firms in the sample 
sought external finance from a wide variety of potential outside investors, and 
some successfully obtained external finance.  This diversity in the data is of 
interest, as it allows us to carry out unique analyses of the decision to seek 
external finance from a broad spectrum of different investors.  By contrast, 
datasets derived from investors typically provide insights into only those firms 
that applied for external finance with that investors, and further, typically only 
those firms that were successful in obtaining finance.  These limitations in all 
empirical prior work based on data from investors and not investees are 
overcome in our analysis of the new data introduced herein.  We are therefore 
able to investigate issues that have been previously considered empirically 
intractable. 
 
The data indicate the following primary key results.  First, we identify factors 
that lead firms to seek external finance.  We empirically show that firms which 
were started to avoid unemployment of the founding entrepreneurs are 
approximately 7% less likely to seek external finance.  There is also evidence 
that firms founded by females are approximately 16% less likely to seek 
external finance; however, that evidence can be explained by the different 




expenditures, lower turnover, and a less pronounced growth orientation.  Firms 
that do seek external finance have the following characteristics: they have 
higher turnover, higher capital expenditures, and higher capital expenditures / 
profits.  It is noteworthy that, controlling for a large number of other factors, we 
find the most significant determinant of applications for external finance to be 
capital expenditures / profits.  This indicates support for the traditional pecking 
order in which firms finance new projects internally before seeking external 
finance.  It is also quite noteworthy that, on a ranking from 1-4 with 4 being the 
highest growth orientation, an increase in the ranking by 1 point tends to 
increase the probability of an application for external finance by approximately 
10%. 
 
Second, we show systematic characteristics drive the amount of external finance 
actually sought.  Firms seek a greater amount of external finance when then 
have greater capital expenditures, profits, capital expenditures / profits, and 
when they recently developed a new innovation.  Controlling for the non-
randomness in the decision to seek external finance in the first place in the spirit 
of Heckman (1976, 1979), we find a significant relation between a firm’s capital 
expenditures / profits and the amount of external finance actually sought, which 
again supports the traditional pecking order.   
 
In the third step of the analyses, we consider the percentage of external finance 
obtained.  There is some evidence that a smaller percentage of capital is 
obtained when more is asked for by the firms, and evidence that a greater 
percentage of capital is obtained among older firms and firms with greater profit 
levels; however, those results are not robust to the particular econometric 
specification.  There is also some evidence of a comparatively smaller 
percentage of finance obtained, relative to the amount asked for, among firms 
started by females; but again, that result is not robust to controls for other 
variables (suggesting firms started by females obtain less financing because of 
their other attributes, such as their innovativeness).  The most robust result is 
that the percentage of external finance obtained is smaller among firms that face 
a greater number of larger competitors (in terms of asset size).  Firms facing a 
10% higher percentage of competitors that are larger direct competitors tend to 
face a 10% reduction in the percentage of finance that they are able to obtain 
from sources of capital, and the statistical and economic significance of this 
evidence is robust to selection effects in applications for external capital across 
all potential sources. 
 
We further explore these three main steps in the analyses outlined above by 
considering the differences between banks and VC funds, as well as other 




discounting firms, trade customers / suppliers, partners / working shareholders, 
private individuals and other sources.  Among the approximately 38% of 1900 
firms in our sample that did seek external finance in the 1996-1997 period 
considered, 554 approached banks, 355 approached leasing firms, 118 
approached factoring / invoice discounting firms, 99 approached partners / 
working shareholders, 70 approached VC funds, 62 approached private 
individuals, and 38 approached trade customers / suppliers (and 46 approached 
other sources).
2  It is of interest that outright rejection rates were highest among 
VC funds (49% rejection), and much higher than that for banks (19% outright 
rejection).  The lowest rejection rate was among leasing firms (5%).  Banks 
comprised the median and mean highest percentage of outside finance in terms 
of which type of source was approached and which type of source provided the 
finance.   
 
Regarding banks and VC funds in particular, our multivariate analyses indicate 
there are some similarities, in that firms with higher capital expenditures and 
growth objectives are more likely to seek and obtain finance from both banks 
and VC funds.  However, the data do indicate three main differences between 
banks and VC funds: (1) firms that recently developed an innovation are 
approximately 35% more likely to both seek and obtain capital from a VC fund; 
(2) firms that are brand new startups are approximately 30% less likely to obtain 
their desired finance from a bank, but not for want of trying to obtain capital 
from a bank; and (3) firms with higher capital expenditures / profits are more 
likely to obtain capital from a bank, but not a VC fund.  The general flavor of 
these results pertaining to banks and VC funds are consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Berger and Udell, 2002; Carpenter and Peterson, 2002; Cressy, 
1996, 2002; Cressy and Toivanen, 2001; Manigart et al., 1996, 2000, 2002a,b,c; 
Toivanen and Cressy, 2001; Wright and Lockett, 1999, 2001; Wright and 
Lockett, 2003), but add to the literature by providing estimates of the economic 
significance which uniquely considers the non-random selection process among 
those entrepreneurial firms that seek external finance. 
 
The new data and statistics introduced in this paper provide completely new 
evidence on the importance of external capital for entrepreneurial firms, and the 
comparative importance of different sources of capital.  It is noteworthy that, 
among the 38% of firms that made non-trivial efforts to obtain external finance 
in our sample, the mean percentage of finance obtained (relative to the amount 
sought) was 84.5%, and the median percentage was 100%.  Overall, while 
rejection rates differ across different sources of external capital, only few firms 
face a problem in obtaining their external capital.  This evidence is somewhat 




comparative dearth of capital, such that there is a capital gap in the small firm 
sector and a need for government intervention. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the related 
literature.  Section 3 introduces the data considered in this paper, and presents a 
number of new facts pertaining to entrepreneurial finance.  The testable 
hypotheses within the context of our new data and the prior literature are 
outlined in section 4.  Summary statistics and multivariate analyses are provided 
in section 5.  Thereafter, limitations, alternative explanations and future 
research are discussed in section 6.  Concluding remarks follow. 
 
2. Related Literature  
 
In this paper we study the choice between internal versus external 
entrepreneurial finance, with regard to a wide variety of sources of outside 
capital.  Because we consider a number of different types of investors, our work 
is related to a plethora of papers along segmented streams of research in 
financial intermediation and entrepreneurial finance.  While it is of course 
beyond the scope of our paper to review the entire literature herein,
3 we 
nevertheless provide a brief perspective of the contribution of our analyses in 
the context of recent related prior work. 
 
At the most generalizable level, a firm’s decision to seek external finance is 
related to information asymmetries faced by investors regarding the 
entrepreneurial firm’s quality (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; De Meza and Webb, 1987, 1992; Cosh and Hughes, 1994; De 
Meza, 2002). Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (2000) have derived a 
pecking order that results from such information asymmetries between 
entrepreneurs and investors, whereby firms first finance new projects with 
internal cash flows, and obtain external finance only where necessary because 
external finance is more costly when investors face information asymmetries.  
External debt finance is preferred to external equity finance in the traditional 
pecking order since equity involves a dilution of the entrepreneur’s ownership 
share.  Recent theoretical work, however, has shown this pecking order is 
reversed where investors have superior knowledge about the commercialization 
process of an entrepreneur’s invention, and/or add value to the entrepreneur’s 
project (Garmaise, 2000). 
 
Pre-IPO outside entrepreneurial capital may be provided by banks, VCs, private 
individuals (‘angel’ investors), leasing, factoring, suppliers/customers, 
partners/working shareholders, among other sources.  Different streams of the 




types for reasons of theoretical tractability and data availability.  Nevertheless, 
the fundamental questions considered in the segmented literature significantly 
overlap in two primary ways that are pertinent to our empirical analyses.  First, 
there is a stream of literature on the ability of an investor to mitigate 
informational problems associated with small (and/or high-tech) businesses, and 
this has been considered in the context of banks (e.g., Berger et al., 2001), VC 
finance (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1999), angel finance (e.g., Wong, 2003), 
lease finance (e.g., Porter, 1995; Myers et al., 1976), supplier finance (e.g., 
Tamari, 1970), etc.  Second, there is a stream of literature on the contribution of 
the investor to the development of the investee firm, which has been assessed in 
the context of banking (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1998), VC finance (e.g., 
Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Kortum and Lerner, 
2000; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Davila et al., 2003; Mayer et al., 2004; Hege et 
al., 2004; Neus and Walz, 2004), lease finance (e.g., Yusopova, 2002), etc. 
 
While some of the issues we consider have been addressed in prior work that is 
segmented by investor type, there is comparatively less rigorous data and 
evidence about the comparative ability of different types of investors to mitigate 
informational problems associated with outside finance, and the comparative 
importance of different sources of capital to different types of entrepreneurial 
firms.  Moreover, given the fact that there is a non-randomness associated with 
the types of firms seeking external capital (in the spirit of Heckman, 1976, 
1979), it is difficult to assess the importance of different types of investors to 
entrepreneurial firms without a comparative sample of firms that did not seek 
any external finance, and without knowledge of alternative sources of external 
finance sought by the firms.  We seek to overcome some of these limitations in 
our analysis.  We also keep in mind areas in which we face limitations 
ourselves, and thereby point to avenues for future research (discussed in detail 
in section 6 below). 
 
Our comparative focus is somewhat related to recent work that has made 
significant steps in comparing two types of financial intermediaries.  The recent 
literature has primarily been focused on comparing banks to VC funds.
4 
Theoretical contributions in this regard invariably conclude that VCs are more 
skilled than bank managers at screening potential investees, and providing 
greater value-added to their investee firms (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2004; 
Udea, 2004; Landlier, 2002).  These propositions are consistent with the large 
literature that focuses on VC funds themselves (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 
2001a,b; Casamatta, 2003; Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2003; Schmidt, 2003; 
Hsu, 2004; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003, 2004; 
Keuschnigg, 2003, 2004a,b).  This work is also consistent with a literature 




other types of potential investors, and does not consider the non-random 
selection process among those entrepreneurial firms that have sought external 
finance, and the non-random selection process across different types of 
investors.  In other words, that work is not immune from the Heckman (1976, 
1979) sample selection bias.
5   Our dataset enables these limitations to be 
overcome, and enables a broader array of different types of investors to be 
considered, among other things described throughout the subsequent sections of 
this paper. 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that our empirical analysis of outside entrepreneurial 
capital is related to a very large theoretical and empirical literature on the 
decision of a privately held business to go public (see, e.g., Ritter and Welch, 
2002, for a recent review of that literature).  Our analysis significantly differs 
from the IPO literature in that we focus on the much earlier decision in the life-
cycle of a private business to seek external private finance, long before it would 
be in a position to go public (and many firms might not want to go public).  And 
as mentioned, our data are not constrained by consideration of only one or two 
types of potential investors; rather, all types of external sources of capital for 
early stage businesses are assessed.  The data introduced in this paper are 
described in the next section.  
 
3. Testable Hypotheses 
 
3.1. Primary Hypotheses 
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on three primary hypotheses which are outlined 
in this section.  Our first hypothesis pertains to the pecking order theory of 
capital structure.  In particular, we are interested in knowing whether 
entrepreneurial firms do in fact prefer to finance projects internally with their 
own profits prior to seeking external finance.  Traditional pecking order theory 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) is consistent with this prediction, since entrepreneurs 
have information that investors do not have, and therefore the information 
asymmetry faced my outside investors makes external finance more costly.  By 
similar reasoning, external equity finance is more costly than external debt 
finance since equity involves the dilution of the entrepreneurs’ ownership 
interest in the firm, and offers of equity finance therefore signal low quality. 
 
Hypothesis 1a [Pecking Order and Decision to Seek External Funds]: A 
more profitable firm is less likely to seek external finance, or at least will seek 
less external capital and use internal profits to fund projects.  Among firms that 
do seek external finance, more profitable firms will seek debt finance prior to 




Hypothesis 1b [Pecking Order and Success with Obtaining External Funds 
Sought]: A more profitable firm is more likely to obtain the external finance 
sought.  
 
Our second central hypothesis considers the decision to seek finance as a 
function of entrepreneurial firm as well as investor characteristics.  The costs of 
seeking and obtaining external capital are higher where entrepreneurial firms 
exhibit greater informational asymmetries.  That is, the search costs for capital, 
as well as the terms offered to the investor, are less favorable for firms for 
which investors have more difficulty mitigating information problems and 
expected agency costs.  Among younger and innovative firms for which these 
costs are more pronounced (as generally viewed in the literature; see e.g., Noe 
and Rebello, 1996), firms will only be willing to incur these costs if they have 
significant growth objectives.  Hence, growth orientated firms are naturally 
more attracted to external finance as a result of their willingness to incur search 
costs and bear the price of external capital. 
 
Just as entrepreneurial firm characteristics matter in respect of external 
financing decisions, we might likewise expect differences across different 
sources of capital.  It is widely regarded that investors such as venture capital 
(VC) funds with comparative advantage in mitigating information asymmetries 
and agency costs (relative to banks, for instance) will be more likely to finance 
businesses for which risks are more pronounced, but potential returns are higher 
(see, e.g., Berger and Udell, 1998). 
 
Hypothesis 2a [Growth]: Firms for which growth is the most significant 
objective will be, all else being equal, more likely to seek external finance. 
 
Hypothesis 2b [Banks versus VCs]: VC funds have a comparative advantage 
at mitigating information asymmetries and agency costs over banks, and will 
therefore be more likely to be approached than banks by riskier growth 
orientated and innovative firms. 
 
Finally, our last hypothesis pertains to industry structure effects on financing 
decisions.  In his popular work on industry structure, Porter (1998) identifies 
five categories of factors that can give rise to differences in risk-adjusted rates 
of return across industries.  These factors include supplier power, buyer power, 
barriers to entry, threat of substitutes and the degree of rivalry.  The economic 
importance of some of these factors has been identified in the literature on a 
firm’s financing decisions.  In short, risk-adjusted rates of return tend to be 
lower in industries for which there is more competition, and a stronger presence 




provide external capital to entrepreneurial firms in those industries, and the 
terms offered by investors will be less attractive. 
 
Hypothesis 3 [Industry Competition]: Firms that face more competitors and a 
stronger presence of larger dominant competitors will be less likely to obtain the 
amount of external capital that they seek. 
 
3.2. Control Variables 
 
In considering the three primary hypotheses we control for a number of 
potentially relevant factors.  First, we consider the innovativeness of the 
industry, as well as the innovativeness of the firm.  Innovation is associated 
with asset intangibility, since high-tech firms are typically more innovative and 
have more intangible assets (Kortum and Lerner, 2000).  Higher asset 
intangibility is is associated with more pronounced information asymmetries 
and agency costs, as well as potential hold-up costs, thereby increasing the costs 
of external finance (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  On one hand, therefore, we 
would expect the costs of obtaining external finance to be greater among more 
innovative firms.  On the other hand, the potential benefits to external equity 
financiers are larger the more innovative the firm.  This is particularly true 
among a smaller subset of investors that add value to their investees. This value 
added can come in a variety of forms, including but not limited to advice 
pertaining to strategy, marketing, financing, administrative and human resource 
policy, as well as facilitating a network of contacts for firms that includes, but is 
not limited to, accountants, suppliers, customers, lawyers, and investment 
bankers.  For example, one recent theoretical paper (Garmaise, 2000) predicts 
the traditional pecking order is exactly reversed when investors do provide 
value added and have superior skills at assessing the value of the entrepreneurial 
project.
6  Hence, in our empirical analyses we consider differences in financing 
obtained from banks and venture capitalists. 
 
Second, we control for an oft-repeated conventional wisdom that 
entrepreneurial firms started by females face greater hurdles in seeking external 
capital.  On one level, this could simply be unjustified or “actual” sex 
discrimination.  On another level, there might be characteristics of firms started 
by females that are systematically different relative to firms started by males, 
such as the firm’s growth objectives, the professional qualifications of the 
firm’s directors, the firm’s innovative activities and industry sector, among 
numerous other systematic differences.  If so, then information asymmetries 
faced by outside investors might systematically differ across firms started by 
males and females, thereby causing systematic differences in the costs and 




label this second perspective as “apparent” (not actual) sex discrimination 
whereby information problems and firm characteristics give rise to the 
appearance of discrimination between males versus females, but such 
discrimination is directly attributable to those characteristics and not 
independently related to the maleness or femaleness of the firm’s founding 
CEO.  Either way, we do consider and control for these alternative theories in 
our empirical analyses. 
 
Finally, in our empirical tests we also control for legal form (corporation, 
partnership or sole proprietorship), firm age, capital expenditures, and a variety 
of reasons why the entrepreneurial firm was established (including reasons 
ranging from a desire to avoid unemployment to running a business, 
implementing an invention and wealth ambitions).  Each of these variables 
(among others discussed immediately below) are pertinent as control variables, 
since they directly relate to a firm’s need/desire for external capital for reasons 
discussed in prior literature summarized in section 2.  The specifics in our data 
are outlined in detail immediately below in section 4.  Empirical tests follow in 
section 5. 
 
4. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
Our data comprise very detailed survey data from 1900 UK entrepreneurial 
firms in the period spanning 1996-1997.  The data were collected by the Center 
for Business Research at the University of Cambridge, as described in detail by 
Cosh and Hughes (1998). The median start-up year of the firms in the data 
herein was 1984, where 517 started in the 1990s, 645 started in 1980s, 685 
started prior to 1980, and the remaining 53 had an unknown start year.   
 
The sampling frame for the survey was all independent businesses in 
manufacturing and business services with less than 500 employees in Great 
Britain including businesses partnerships and sole proprietors. The achieved 
sample was 2484 firms based on size stratified approach to avoid swamping the 
sample with micro businesses. The unit response rate was 25%. A response bias 
analysis in terms of age employment turnover pre tax profit and legal status 
revealed that older manufacturing firms were somewhat less likely to respond. 
There was no response bias of any kind in service business responses, nor any 
bias in manufacturing firms responses in terms of age profitability or legal 
status. A spatial analysis revealed that the achieved sample was representative 
of the regional distribution of the small business population in Great Britain 
(complete details on survey design and sample selection issues are provided in 





Summary statistics of the data, as well as correlations across different variables, 
are provided in Tables 1-4.  There were 38% or (714 of 1860) firms in the data 
that did seek external finance in the 1996-1997 period, and 40 firms for which 
we were unable to ascertain whether or not external finance was sought (see 
Table 1).  The average amount of external finance sought was £473,384, and the 
median amount sought was £100,000.  The average amount obtained was 
almost 85% of that which was sought, and the median percentage obtained was 
100%.  Overall, therefore, the data do not suggest a shortage of external capital 










Table 1.  Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table presents definitions of each of the variables, along with summary statistics.  The total sample size is 1900 firms.  The number of observations differs for each 
variable if the requested information from the firm was not available, or if the information requested applied only to a subset of the firms (e.g., the amount of external 
finance sought is a variable that only applies for those firms that actually sought external finance).  These variables are used in the subsequent tables and regression 
analyses. 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum Observations 
Dependent Variables                      
External Finance Sought 
A dummy variable equal to one if the firm attempted to 
obtain external finance (i.e. additional to internal cash 
flows) in the 1996-1997 period. 
0.384 0.000  0.487  0.000  1.000  1860 
Amount of External 
Finance Sought 
The (strictly positive) amount of external finance sought 
by the business in the 1996-1997 period.  Measured in 
thousands of 1997 pounds. 
473.348 100.000  1418.722  1.000  20000.000  620 
External Finance 
Obtained 
The percentage of external finance obtained by the 
business in the 1996-1997 period (as a fraction of the 
amount sought). 
84.553 100.000  30.921  0.000  100.000  561 
External Finance Sought 
from Banks 
A dummy variable equal to one if the firm attempted to 
obtain external finance from a bank (i.e. additional to 
internal cash flows) in the 1996-1997 period. 
0.736 0.000  1.216  0.000  4.000  1900 
External Finance 
Obtained from Banks 
An ordered variable equal to 0 if a bank was approached 
but no finance offered, 1 if a bank was approached but 
offered less than the full amount, and 2 if a bank was 
approached and offered the full amount.   
1.480 2.000  0.809  0.000  3.000  564 
External Finance Sought 
from VC Funds 
A dummy variable equal to one if the firm attempted to 
obtain external finance from a venture capital fund (i.e. 
additional to internal cash flows) in the 1996-1997 
period. 
0.073 0.000  0.416  0.000  4.000  1900 
External Finance 
Obtained from VC 
Funds 
An ordered variable equal to 0 if a VC fund was 
approached but no finance offered, 1 if a VC was 
approached but offered less than the full amount, and 2 
if a VC was approached and offered the full amount.   
0.958 1.000  0.977  0.000  3.000  71 
Independent Variables                      
Firm Financial 
Characteristics                      
Log (Profits) 
The natural log of pre-tax profits (losses) before 
deduction of interest, tax, and directors’, partners’ or 
proprietors’ emoluments. Measured in thousands of 
1997 pounds.  [scaled to avoid negatives] 
7.967 7.929  0.250  0.000  9.450  1473 
Log (Capital 
Expenditures) 
The natural log of the firm's total capital expenditures in 
1996-1997. Measured in thousands of 1997 pounds.   3.461 3.434  2.170  0.000  10.951  1470 
Log (Capital 
Expenditures / Profits) 
Log of capital expenditures per profits.  [scaled to avoid 
negatives]  -4.339       -4.236  2.067       -8.344        6.974        1470 
Log (Turnover)  The natural log of the firm's total turnover in 1996-
1997. Measured in thousands of 1997 pounds  6.363 6.375  1.750  0.000  11.408  1347 
Innovation 
A dummy variable equal to one if the Firm developed a 
new commercialisable technology in the 1996-1997 
period 
0.235 0.000  0.424  0.000  1.000  1702 
Firm Age and Profile                      
Log (Age)  The natural log of the firm's age as at 1997 from date of 
incorporation.  2.669 2.639  0.962  0.000  5.628  1847 
Professional Directors 
The proportion of directors with an advanced degree in 
science, engineering or some other professional 
qualification. 
0.535 0.500  0.499  0.000  2.000  1431 
Gender  The gender of the firm’s Chief Executive/Senior 
Partner/Proprietor (1=male, 2=female)  1.079 1.000  0.270  1.000  2.000  1861 
Growth Objectives 
The firm's planned growth objectives over the 1997 - 
2000 period (1=become smaller, 2=stay the same size, 
3=grow moderately, 4=grow substantially) 




Table 1.  (Continued) 
Variable Name  Definition  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum Observations 
Corporation  A dummy variable equal to 1 for incorporated firms  0.782      1.000  0.413  0.000  1.000  1900 
Partnership  A dummy variable equal to 1 for partnerships  0.124       0.000  0.330  0.000  1.000  1900 
Sole Proprietorship  A dummy variable equal to 1 for sole proprietorship  0.094   0.000  0.291  0.000  1.000  1900 
Reason Firm 
Established                      
Completely New Start-
ups 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that were 
Completely New Start-ups  0.629 1.000  0.483  0.000  1.000  1900 
Founded to avoid 
unemployment of 
founder(s) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms founded to avoid 
unemployment of founder(s)  0.652 1.000  0.476  0.000  1.000  1900 
Founded for desire of 
founder(s) to run own 
business 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms founded for 
desire of founder(s) to run his or her own business  0.815 1.000  0.389  0.000  1.000  1900 
Founded to implement 
an invention 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms founded to 
implement an invention  0.249 0.000  0.433  0.000  1.000  1900 
Founded due to wealth 
ambitions of founders 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms founded due to 
wealth ambitions of founders  0.245 0.000  0.430  0.000  1.000  1900 
Competitors / Industry                      
Larger Competitors  The proportion of the firm's primary competitors that 
are larger than the firm.  0.695 0.750  0.323  0.000  1.000  1467 
Log (Total Competitors)  The natural log of the total number of serious 
competitors of the firm.  1.810 1.792  1.026  0.000  8.517  1634 
Industry Innovativeness 
The percentage of the firm's sales for which products or 
services were unchanged or only marginally changed in 
the last 3 years. 






Table 2. Summary Statistics and Correlations for Specific Sources of External Capital 
This table presents summary statistics and correlation coefficients for each specific source of external capital (banks, venture capital (VC) funds, hire purchase or 
leasing firms, factoring / invoice discounting firms, trade customers / suppliers, partners / working shareholders, other private individuals and other).  The number of 
firms that did and did not approach the source is indicated, followed by the rejection and success rates among those firms that did approach the source.  The statistics 
for the mean, median, standard deviation and minimum and maximum percentage of capital obtained from the each source is indicated.  Correlations with various 
variables for the characteristics of the businesses are presented; correlations significant at the 5% level are highlighted in underline font. 

















Number of Firms that Did Approach this 
Source for External Capital  554 70  355  118  38  99  62  46 
Number of Firms that Did Not Approach 
this Source, but Did Seek External Finance 
Elsewhere 
126 619  330  571  652  584  623  639 
Number of Firms that Did Approach this 
Source but No Finance Offered  104 34  16  23  4  8  15  9 
Number of Firms that Approached this 
Source but Less than Full Amount Offered  95 7  14  29  8  9  11  10 
Number that Did Approach this Source and 
Full Amount Offered  355 29  325  66  26  82  36  27 
Mean Percentage of Total External Capital 
Obtained from this Source  42.92 3.11  25.45  5.77  0.89  6.26  4.38  4.09 
Median Percentage of Total External 
Capital Obtained from this Source  40 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Standard Deviation of Percentage Obtained 
from this Source  41.50 15.38  36.71  19.35  7.20  20.12  18.34  18.06 
Minimum Amount Obtained from this 
Source  0 0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Maximum Amount Obtained from this 
Source  100 100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Correlations with Percentage Obtained 
from Source and Other Variables                         
Firm Financial Characteristics                         
Log (Profits)  0.12 -0.03  -0.06  -0.09 -0.03  0.12 -0.06  0.00 
Log (Capital Expenditures)  -0.03  0.08 0.21 0.01  -0.08 -0.13 -0.01  -0.13 
Log (Capital Expenditures / Profits)  -0.04     0.09    0.22     0.02    -0.08    -0.14     0.00    -0.14 
Log (Turnover)  0.05  0.17 0.04  0.05  -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.16 
Innovation -0.04  0.02  -0.08 0.00  0.03  -0.05  0.09 0.13 
Firm Age and Profile                
Log (Age)  0.02  -0.02  0.14 -0.06  -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 
Professional Directors  0.08 0.12 -0.18 -0.13 0.03  0.11 0.12 0.01 
Gender 0.06  -0.04  -0.10 0.11 0.06  0.06  -0.03  -0.05 
Growth Objectives  -0.01  0.09 -0.06  0.10 0.11  -0.14 0.04  0.12 
Corporation  0.01     0.07    -0.04     0.05    -0.01    -0.11     0.03     0.03 
Partnership  -0.01    -0.07    0.04    -0.05     0.01     0.11    -0.03    -0.03 
Sole Proprietorship  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Reason Firm Established                  
Completely New Start-ups  0.03  0.08 -0.06  0.02  0.06  -0.10 -0.06  0.04 
Founded to avoid unemployment of 
founder(s)  -0.02 -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  0.05  0.01  -0.01  0.09 
Founded for desire of founder(s) to run own 
business  0.02 -0.01  0.02  -0.03  -0.06  -0.01  -0.04  0.03 
Founded to implement an invention  -0.06  0.10 -0.08 0.04  0.03  -0.03  0.15 0.10 
Founded due to wealth ambitions of 
founders  0.04 -0.09 0.07  0.02  -0.08 -0.04 -0.02  -0.02 
Competitors / Industry                     
Larger Competitors  -0.07  0.04  -0.08 -0.02  0.10 0.11 0.01  0.02 
Log (Total Competitors)  -0.01  0.04  0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.01  -0.05  0.00 
Industry Innovativeness  0.08 -0.03  0.03  0.03  -0.09 0.07 -0.12 -0.18  
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation coefficients across the variables that were defined in Table 1.  Correlations that are statistically significant at the 5% level are highlighted in underline font.  N/A refers to not applicable; for example, 
where the amount of external finance sought is left blank if no external finance is sought (so there is no correlation between variables (1) and (2). 
        (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
   Dependent Variables                                                                        
(1)  External Finance Sought  1.00                                                                     
(2)  Amount of External Finance Sought  N/A  1.00                                                                  
(3)  External Finance Obtained  N/A  0.25  1.00                                                               
(4)  External Finance Sought from Banks  0.77 0.31 0.75  1.00                                                            
(5)  External Finance Obtained from Banks  N/A  0.31 0.75 1.00  1.00                                                         
(6)  External Finance Sought from VC Funds  0.21 0.24 0.81 0.52 0.52  1.00                                                      
(7)  External Finance Obtained from VC Funds  N/A  0.24 0.81 0.52 0.52 1.00  1.00                                                   
   Independent Variables                                                                   
   Firm Financial Characteristics                                                                   
(8)  Log (Profits)  0.03  0.43 0.17 0.05 0.20 0.00  0.22  1.00                                                
(9)  Log (Capital Expenditures)  0.22 0.45 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.09 0.15 0.15  1.00                                             
(10)  Log (Capital Expenditures / Profits)  0.22     0.19  0.10   -
0.03  0.98  1.00                 
(11)  Log (Turnover)  0.10 0.47 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.67 0.65  1.00                                        
(12)  Innovation 0.03  0.12 -0.16 0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.16  -
0.02  0.20 0.21 0.11  1.00                                     
   Firm Age and Profile                                                             
(13)  Log (Age)  0.01  0.32 0.08 0.00  0.22 -0.02  0.31 0.07 0.26 0.25 0.40  -0.03  1.00                                  
(14)  Professional Directors  -0.01  0.06  -0.24 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.43 0.07 0.06 0.05  0.05  0.06  0.00  1.00                               
(15)  Gender -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -
0.02  -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07  -
0.03  0.04  1.00                            
(16)  Growth Objectives  0.16 0.04 -0.19 0.13  -
0.26  0.09 -0.10 0.00  0.24 0.18 0.18 0.22  -
0.08  0.08  -0.02  1.00                         
(17)  Corporation  0.02     0.00  0.00  0.02    0.00   0.07    0.00  -
0.03    0.10    0.11 0.16      0.14    -
0.08  -0.09   -0.04    0.12    1.00          
   Reason Firm Established                                                         
(18)  Completely New Start-ups  0.02  -0.17 -0.21 0.01  -
0.27  0.01 0.07  -
0.02  0.01 0.01  0.03  0.05 0.17 -0.04 -0.03 0.12  -0.00   1.00                   
(19) 
Founded to avoid unemployment of 
founder(s)  -0.03 -0.24 -0.41 -0.04  -
0.20  -0.05 -0.36  -
0.07  -0.03 -0.02  -0.05 0.06  -
0.08  0.03 -0.01 0.05  -0.01   -0.01  1.00                
(20) 
Founded for desire of founder(s) to run own 
business  0.01 -0.28 -0.31 0.02  -
0.05  -0.03 -0.23  -
0.05  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.04 -0.04      0.13 0.26  1.00              
(21)  Founded to implement an invention  0.03  -0.02  -0.23 0.00  -
0.44  0.05 -0.12 0.01  0.05 0.05 0.01 0.18  -
0.01  0.04 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.07 -0.12  1.00          
(22) 
Founded due to wealth ambitions of 
founders  0.08 -0.14 -0.39 0.04  -
0.40  -0.08 -0.35 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.01  -
0.05  -0.02 -0.04 0.11    0.05   -0.02  0.24 0.09 0.06 1.00         
   Competitors / Industry                                    
(23)  Larger Competitors  -0.01  0.26 -0.15 -0.03  -
0.35  -0.02 -0.01  -
0.08  -0.19 -0.19 -0.16 0.02  -
0.10  0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.09      0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 1.00     
(24)  Log (Total Competitors)  0.04  -0.14 -0.08 0.05  -
0.03  0.01 0.22 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.14 -0.09 0.01 0.12 0.00 -0.03 0.00      -0.06 0.03 0.04  -0.10 0.02 -0.06 1.00 
(25)  Industry Innovativeness  -0.09 0.04 0.31 -0.04  0.37 -0.02  0.22  -
0.05  -0.20 -0.19 -0.04 -0.39 0.13 -0.10 0.05 -0.24 -0.10    -0.03  -






Table 4.  Comparison of Means and Medians for Profit Performance of Firms Seeking External Capital  
This table presents comparison tests for the profit performance of businesses that did and did not seek external capital.  Profit figures indicated are in '000 1997 pounds.  For the businesses that did seek 
external capital, comparisons are also provided for the amounts sought relative to the capital expenditures.  *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
      Number of Firms  Average  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard Deviation 
(1) 
Profit performance of firms with capital 
expenditure but do not seek external 
finance at all 





























Profit performance of firms with capital 
expenditure which is greater than the 
amount of external capital sought 





























Profit performance of firms with capital 
expenditure which is less than or equal to 
the amount of external capital sought 
232 241.33  58.50  -2139.00  8400.00  769.56 
(4)  Profit performance of firms with no capital 

























Profit performance of firms with no capital 
expenditure and do not seek external 
finance 
108 83.32  29.00  -4.00  1500.00  193.68 
 
Difference of Means and Medians Tests 
 Means  Test Medians  Test 
(1) versus (2)   -1.08  p <= 0.0003*** 
(1) versus (3)  0.15  p <= 0.004*** 
(1) versus (4)   -0.29  p <= 0.435  
(1) versus (5)   5.32***   p <= 8.35e-08*** 
(2) versus (3)  -0.88   p <= 8.07e-07*** 
(2) versus (4)  0.77  p <= 0.008*** 
(2) versus (5)  5.50***   p <= 0.0003*** 
(3) versus (4)  -0.33  p <= 0.006*** 
(3) versus (5)  2.93***  p <= 5.63e-12*** 




Table 2 reports the number of firms in our data that did seek external finance by 
the type of source of finance, as well as the percentage of all their external 
capital obtained from the source.  Among the firms in our sample that did seek 
external finance, 554 approached banks, 355 approached leasing firms, 118 
approached factoring / invoice discounting firms, 99 approached partners / 
working shareholders, 70 approached VC funds, 62 approached private 
individuals, and 38 approached trade customers / suppliers (and 46 approached 
other sources).  It is of interest that outright rejection rates were highest among 
VC funds (49% rejection), and much higher than that for banks (19% outright 
rejection).  The lowest rejection rate was among leasing firms (5%).  Banks 
comprised the median and mean highest percentage of outside finance in terms 
of which type of source was approached and which type of source provided the 
finance.  In fact, banks comprised the only type of source for which the median 
percentage of a firm’s total external capital was greater than 0% (for banks, the 
median percentage is 40%; see Table 2). 
 
A number of the correlations in Table 2 provide insights into the different 
characteristics of the different types of investors.  Banks are statistically more 
likely to finance profitable businesses, those with professional directors, and 
firms in industries that are less innovative.  Banks provide debt finance, have 
very large portfolios, and typically use preset criteria in ascertaining whether the 
firm is a suitable risk for a loan. 
 
The data indicate VC funds, by contrast, are more likely to finance businesses 
with higher capital expenditures and turnover, as well as those with a higher 
proportion of professional directors, high growth objectives, new start-ups,
7 and 
businesses founded to implement an invention.  These results are expected in 
the data.  VC funds provide finance that has typically has some equity upside 
potential in the investees.  VC managers have small portfolios (often no more 
than 5 investees per fund manager; see Kanniainen and Keuschingg, 2003, 
2004; Cumming, 2004), and provide significant screening pre-investment and 
value-added post investment in their investee firms. 
 
Hire purchase or leasing firms are more likely to finance older businesses with 
high capital expenditures, little innovation, a smaller proportion of professional 
directors, and firms started by males and not females, and firms in industries 
with fewer larger competitors.  In short, leasing businesses act in ways that are 
somewhat similar to banks.  The main difference is that the leasing business 





Factor / invoice discounting firms provide cash advances on the basis of an 
unpaid invoice, so that a firm may meet cash shortages.
8  This type of financing 
tends to be used by firms with fewer professional directors, firms started by 
females, as well as firms with high growth objectives and lower profit levels.  
The type of finance provided by an invoice discounting firm is such that they do 
not have concerns with information problems associated with the quality of the 
firm that obtains the finance, but rather, with the firm or customer with the 
unpaid invoice. 
 
Trade customers / suppliers are more likely to finance younger firms with low 
capital expenditures, low turnover, firms with larger competitors and firms in 
industries with less innovation.  This is intuitive, since there are proprietary 
rights associated with innovative industries and smaller innovative firms will be 
reluctant to seek capital from larger suppliers due to potential hold up problems 
with innovative ideas.  For more traditional industries, however, suppliers are a 
natural source of capital for some developing firms securing a supply chain for 
developing their own products. 
 
Partners / working shareholders are more likely to be a significant source of 
capital for more profitable businesses with professional directors, and firms 
with lower capital expenditures, low growth objectives, and larger competitors.  
This is also fairly intuitive for reasons similar to the intuition for the evidence 
for the trade customers / suppliers discussed immediately above.  Significant 
agency problems may arise in partnerships that could inhibit growth of a firm. 
 
Finally, the category of “other private individuals” in Table 2 (also known as 
“Angel” investors) indicates similar patterns as with the VC funds.  Angel 
investors finance young businesses with strong management and high quality 
directors, and particularly those firms which were started to implement an 
invention in highly innovative industries. 
 
Table 3 provides additional correlation statistics across various variables that 
are used in the multivariate empirical analyses in the next section.  The matrix 
gives further insights into the data, and provides guidance in terms of 
considering issues of collinearity in the regressions in section 5.  Specific 
testable hypotheses are first outlined in section 4 before proceeding to the 
multivariate regressions which are presented in section 5. 
 
Table 4 contrasts the profit performance of those firms that (1) have capital 
expenditure but do not seek external finance at all, with (2) have capital 
expenditures which are more than the amount of finance sought, (3) have capital 




capital expenditure and seek external finance, and (5) have no capital 
expenditure and do not seek finance.  Categories (1) and (2) comprise 
businesses that are ‘internal growth financers’, category (3) comprise businesses 
that are ‘external growth financers’, and categories (4) and (5) comprise ‘non-
asset growth firms’.  The data indicate that category (5) firms have lower 
average and median profits relative to any other category. The highest median 
profits are among businesses in category (2).  The fact that median profits 
among category (2) is greater than median profits among category (3) suggests 
support for the pecking order hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a in section 3).   
However, median profits in category (4) are greater than that for category (3), 
which suggests other firm characteristics should be examined in a multivariate 
setting.  Such multivariate tests are provided in the next section. 
 
5. Multivariate Empirical Analyses 
 
In this section, we provide unique multivariate tests of these theoretical 
propositions by first considering the firm’s decision to seek external financing 
in subsection 5.1.  We then analyze the extent of finance sought in subsection 
5.2, taking into account (in the spirit of Heckman, 1976, 1979) the first step 
non-randomness in the decision to seek outside capital.  Subsection 5.3 
considers the percentage of external capital obtained relative to the amount 
sought.  Thereafter, we provide tests of differences across venture capital funds 
and banks in subsection 5.4.  Section 6 discusses potential limitations and 
alternative explanations, and suggests avenues for future research.  Concluding 
remarks follow in section 7. 
 
5.1. Which Firms Seek External Finance? 
 
In this subsection we identify factors that lead firms to seek external finance.  
We make use of logit regressions in which the left-hand-side variable is dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm sought external finance in the 1996-1997 
period.  A variety of explanatory variables are considered, as indicated in Table 





Table 5. Logit Analyses of Which Businesses Seek External Finance 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the probability that a business seeks external finance.  The dependent variable is a binary variable 
equal to one if the business sought external finance in the past two years (from 1997).  The independent variables are as defined in Table 1.  The 
total population of firms comprised 1900 UK firms.  Observations were skipped where there were missing values for the dependent or 
independent variables.  The values presented are not the standard logit coefficients; rather, they are the marginal effects so that the economic 
significance is shown alongside the statistical significance.  *, **, *** Significant difference for the sample of all other firms in the group at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Constant  -0.156  -0.064 -0.536*** -0.241  -0.421 
Firm Financial Characteristics                
Log (Profits)  0.033           0.075 
Log (Capital Expenditures)        0.052***       
Log (Capital Expenditures / Profits)           0.050***  0.071*** 
Log (Turnover)     0.035***        -0.035* 
Innovation              -0.049 
Firm Age and Profile                
Log (Age)  -0.010  -0.037*  -0.027  -0.032  -0.003 
Professional Directors     -0.007  -0.016  -0.040  -0.034 
Gender -0.161***  -0.087  0.0142  0.119  0.035 
Growth Objectives        0.102***  0.100***  0.090** 
Corporation           0.012  -0.012 
Reason Firm Established                
Completely New Start-ups        -0.016     0.002 
Founded to avoid unemployment of founder(s)        -0.070*     -0.061 
Founded for desire of founder(s) to run own business        0.029     0.031 
Founded to implement an invention        0.024     0.017 
Founded due to wealth ambitions of founders        0.045     0.071 
Competitors / Industry                
Larger Competitors           0.035  0.040 
Log (Total Competitors)           0.0002  0.021 
Industry Innovativeness     -0.001  0.0003  0.0004  -0.001 
Model Diagnostics                
Number of Observations  1418  929  795  718  600 
Loglikelihood  -953.697 -624.047 -508.796 -473.697  -390.340 
Pseudo R
2  0.005 0.011 0.061 0.043  0.056 
Chi-Squared Statistic  9.684***  14.461***  66.632***  42.946***  46.231 
 
Firms that do seek external finance have the following characteristics: they have 
higher turnover (Model 2) and higher capital expenditures (Model 3), and 
higher capital expenditures / profits (Models 4 and 5).
9  We do not observe a 
direct relation between profits and applications for external finance (Models 1 
and 5).  The relation between capital expenditures / profits and external finance 
applications is also graphically illustrated in Figure 1.  This indicates support 
for the traditional pecking order in which firms finance new projects internally 
before seeking external finance (see Hypothesis 1a outlined above in section 4).  
Firms applying for external finance also tend to be younger firms with a strong 
growth orientation (in support of Hypothesis 2a).  On a ranking from 1-4 with 4 
being the highest growth orientation for the 3 years subsequent to the 




increase the probability of an application for external finance by approximately 
10% (see Models 3 – 5). 
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Log (Capital Expenditures / Profits) [scaled]
Figure 1.  Applications for External Finance and Capital Expenditures / Profits
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2a is the fact that there is some evidence that the 
motivation that led to the formation of the business affects the propensity to 
seek external finance.  In particular, Model 3 in Table 5 indicates firms which 
were started to avoid unemployment of the founding entrepreneurs are 
approximately 7% less likely to seek external finance (but this evidence is not 
supported in the alternative specification in Model 5). 
 
There is also evidence in Model 1 that firms founded by females are 
approximately 16% less likely to seek external finance; however, that evidence 
can be explained by the different characteristics exhibited by firms started by 
females, such as lower capital expenditures, lower turnover and lower rates of 
innovation (as indicated in Models 2-5 in Table 5, and the correlation 
coefficients reported in Table 3).  In short, the evidence does not favor actual 
sex discrimination, but does suggest the presence of apparent sex discrimination 
at least in respect of the effect on the propensity that discrimination might have 
on the decision to seek external finance. 
 
Finally, note that we do not observe any differences in industry or market 




predictions in Hypothesis 3).  In the next subsections, we nevertheless consider 
this issue along with the other hypotheses about the amount of finance sought 
and obtained. 
 
5.2. The Amount of External Finance Sought 
 
Table 6 presents regression evidence that indicates systematic characteristics 
drive the amount of external finance actually sought.  Heckman corrected 
estimates are also presented which takes into account non-randomness in the 
decision of firms to actually seek external finance in the first place.  For reasons 
of succinctness, we do not report other specifications for the Heckman corrected 
estimates (Models 4 and 5, Table 6).  We selected a specification that 
minimized the overlap between the variables of the two steps in the regressions, 
because overlapping variables can cause bias (see, e.g., Puhani, 2000).   
Alternative specifications with minimal overlapping variables provided 
consistent results to that which is reported.  Note that we also considered the 
robustness of our results to outlier observations (as identified by Cook’s 
distances and leverage plots).  The results are robust.  For instance, removing 
the outliers apparent in Figure 2, we do not find any material differences in the 
regression results reported in the Tables.  Additional specifications are available 






Table 6. Regression Analyses of Amount of External Finance Sought 
This table presents OLS and Heckman corrected regression estimates of the amount of external finance sought.  The dependent variable in Models (1) - (3) is the 
(strictly positive) amount of external finance sought by the business in the past two years (from 1997).  Observations where no external finance was sought are 
skipped.  Models (4) and (5) are a two-step Heckman corrected model, where the first step considers the probability that external finance was sought, and the 
second step accounts for the amount of external finance sought.  The independent variables are as defined in Table 1.  The total population of firms comprised 
1900 UK firms.  Observations were skipped where there were missing values for the independent variables.  The values presented for step (1) of Models (4) and 
(5) are not the standard logit coefficients; rather, they are the marginal effects so that the economic significance is shown alongside the statistical significance.  *, 
**, *** Significant difference for the sample of all other firms in the group at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Model 4  Model 5 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Step 1  Step 2  Step 1  Step 2 
Constant  -30751.055** -47085.155*** -42758.190**  -0.148 -38046.288** -0.148  -374.257 
Firm Financial Characteristics                      
Log (Profits)  3908.668**  5952.166**  5250.444**     4722.858***       
Log (Capital Expenditures)               87.629**      
Log (Capital Expenditures / Profits)        40.137          142.621*** 
Log (Turnover)     11.764  114.579     43.872     201.047 
Innovation        528.396*  0.394***     0.394***    
Firm Age and Profile                      
Log (Age)  52.870  -8.355  30.496     -20.971     25.799 
Professional Directors     68.405  11.485             
Gender -72.354  -81.769  248.443  -0.350*  60.038  -0.350*  -70.064 
Growth Objectives        -63.411             
Corporation        225.828           -120.069 
Reason Firm Established                      
Completely New Start-ups        -174.317           -102.323 
Founded to avoid unemployment of 
founder(s)        -27.355             
Founded for desire of founder(s) to run 
own business        121.043             
Founded to implement an invention        -57.542             
Founded due to wealth ambitions of 
founders        -48.227     -80.962       
Competitors / Industry                      
Larger Competitors        351.475             
Log (Total Competitors)        -76.598             
Industry Innovativeness     1.312  2.237     2.042     1.951 
Heckman's Lambda              -0.199     -0.225 
Model Diagnostics                      
Number  of  Observations  515 325 243  1642  360  1642  369 
Loglikelihood  -4398.884 -2803.176 -2062.919  -1093.823  -3125.481  -1093.823  -3174.130 
Adjusted R
2 (Pseudo R
2 for Model 5, 
Step 1)   0.204 0.324 0.420  0.007  0.334  0.007  0.133 
F Statistic (Chi Squared for Model 5, 
Step 1)  44.79*** 26.92*** 11.31***  15.19***  24.09***  15.19***  8.08*** 
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Table 6 indicates firms with greater profits (Models 1-4), capital expenditures 
(Model 4), and capital expenditures / profits (Model 5) seek a greater amount of 
external finance, in support of Hypothesis 1a.  Model 3 also indicates firms that 
recently developed a new innovation seek a greater amount of external finance 
(approximately £500,000 more capital), in support of Hypothesis 2a. 
 
Models 4 and 5 used the innovation variable as a control in the first step in 
considering whether the firm in fact made an application for external finance.  
We exclude this variable in the second step to mitigate bias from the same 
included right-hand-side variables in steps 1 and 2 (Puhani, 2000).  Alternative 
control variables for the first step regressions did not materially impact the 
interpretation of the second step regression.
10  Controlling for this first step in 
Models 4 and 5, the data indicate capital expenditures and profits (Model 4), 
and capital expenditures / profits (Model 5) seek a greater amount of external 
finance.  The capital expenditures / profits variable is the only statistically 
significant variable in Model 5 Step 2.  These results strongly support the 
pecking order prediction (Hypothesis 1a).  The economic significance is such 
that an increase in capital expenditures / profits by a factor of 10 increases the 
amount of external capital sought by approximately £142,000, whereas an 
increase in capital expenditures / profits by a factor of 100 increases the amount 





The positive relation between capital expenditures / profits and the amount of 
external finance sought is also depicted graphically in the data in Figure 2.   
Note that we have expressed the right-hand-side variables in logs.  A linear 
specification (either in terms of capital expenditures / profits or capital 
expenditures – profits) does not give rise to a statistically significant and 
positive relation with the amount of capital sought.  The nonlinear specification 
models the relation as a concave specification, such that a firm’s application for 
external capital increases at a decreasing rate as capital expenditures / profits 
increases.  The intuition for this non-linear relation is that at very high levels of 
capital expenditures, firms are not as likely to apply for an equal amount of 
external finance as this would reduce the probability that such amounts would 
be granted by the financier.  This issue is further addressed in the next 
subsection. 
 
5.3. The Percentage of External Finance Obtained 
 
Table 7 presents evidence from OLS and Heckman-corrected regressions that 
indicate systematic characteristics drive the percentage of external finance 
obtained.  The left-hand-side variable is transformed so that it is not bounded 
between 0 and 100%, in a standard way of modeling fractions (see, e.g., 
Bierens, 2003), so that the residuals and estimates have properties consistent 





Table 7. Regression Analyses of Percentage of External Finance Obtained 
This table presents OLS and Heckman corrected regression estimates of the percentage of external finance obtained.  The dependent variable in Models (1) - 
(3) is ln(Y/(1-Y)), where Y is the percentage of external finance sought by the business in the past two years (from 1997).  This transformation of the 
dependent variable enables OLS to be used without bias from being bounded below by zero or bounded above by 100%.  Observations where no external 
finance was sought are skipped.  Models (4) and (5) are a two-step Heckman corrected model, where the first step considers the probability that external 
finance was sought, and the second step accounts for ln(Y/(1-Y)) where Y is the percentage of external finance obtained.  The independent variables are as 
defined in Table 1.  The total population of firms comprised 1900 UK firms.  Observations were skipped where there were missing values for the independent 
variables.  The values presented for step (1) of Models (4) and (5) are not the standard logit coefficients; rather, they are the marginal effects so that the 
economic significance is shown alongside the statistical significance.  *, **, *** Significant difference for the sample of all other firms in the group at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Model 4  Model 5 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Step 1  Step 2  Step 1  Step 2 
Constant -24.866**  -8.11538  -4.594  -0.035  -8.444  -0.035  -13.315 
Firm Financial Characteristics                      
Log (Profits)  4.391***  2.053  2.423     3.041     3.463 
Log (Capital Expenditures)              0.080       
Log (Capital Expenditures / Profits)        0.091     1.002**     0.036 
Log (Turnover)     0.404*  0.619     1.002**     0.959** 
Innovation        -0.488  0.094***     0.094***    
Firm Age and Profile                      
Log (Age)  0.569**  0.408  0.276     0.285     0.375 
Professional Directors     -0.537  -1.211     -6.476**     -1.325 
Gender  -1.071  -2.182 -4.741*  -0.083* -1.470  -0.083*  -6.311** 
Growth Objectives        0.224     -0.395     -0.377 
Corporation        1.000     -0.649     1.810 
Total Amount of Capital Sought        -0.585     -0.649     -0.714* 
Reason Firm Established                      
Completely New Start-ups        -0.572     -0.584     -0.558 
Founded to avoid unemployment of founder(s)        0.272     -0.40016     -0.50537 
Founded for desire of founder(s) to run own business        -0.138     -0.43617     -0.29683 
Founded to implement an invention        -0.687     -0.212     -0.216 
Founded due to wealth ambitions of founders        0.336     1.148     1.171 
Competitors / Industry                      
Larger Competitors        -2.763***     -2.249*     -2.485* 
Log (Total Competitors)        0.069     0.081     0.032 
Industry Innovativeness     0.016  0.007     -0.003     -0.002 
Selection Effect Correction                      
Heckman's Lambda              2.267     2.861 
Model Diagnostics                      
Number of Observations  409  316  231  1642  243  1642  243 
Loglikelihood  -1458.273 -926.711  -685.346 -1093.823 -784.429  -1093.823  -783.040 
Adjusted R
2 (Pseudo R
2 for Model 5, Step 1)   0.029  0.035  0.047  0.007  0.042  0.007  0.045 
F Statistic (Chi Squared for Model 5, Step 1)  5.62***  2.83**  1.62*  15.19***   1.63*  15.19***  1.63* 





Table 7 indicates some evidence of a comparatively smaller percentage of 
finance obtained, relative to the amount asked for, among firms started by 
females (Models 2 and 5).  This is suggestive of actual discrimination; however, 
the statistical significance of this effect is not robust to the use of different 
control variables in Models 1, 2 and 4, suggesting this discrimination might be 
more apparent than actual, in that other factors associated with female firms 
give rise to a lower percentage of capital obtained. 
 
The most robust result pertaining to the percentage of external finance obtained 
is that a comparatively larger percentage of external finance is obtained by firms 
with fewer larger competitors (in terms of asset size): see Models 3, 4 and 5.  
This is very strong support for Hypothesis 3 outlined above in section 4.  Firms 
facing a 10% higher percentage of competitors that are larger direct competitors 
tend to face a 10% reduction in the percentage of finance that they are able to 
obtain from sources of capital.  The statistical and economic significance of this 
evidence is robust to selection effects in applications for external capital across 
all potential sources reported in Models 4 and 5 (among other specifications not 
reported but available upon request). 
 
In sum, although industry competition was not related to applications for 
external finance and the amount of capital sought (subsections 5.1 and 5.2 
immediately above), industry competition is in fact of central importance in 
understanding the proportion of external finance that a firm is able to obtain.  
Hence, the data do support Hypothesis 3.  The data do not, however, support 
Hypothesis 1a that more profitable firms are more likely to obtain a greater 
percentage of external finance sought. 
 
5.4. Differences between VC Funds and Banks 
 
Table 8 Panels A and B explores further the issues addressed above by 
considering the differences between banks and VC funds.  As discussed above 
in section 3 (Hypothesis 2b), among the approximately 38% of 1900 firms in 
our sample that did seek external finance in the 1996-1997 period considered, 
554 approached banks, and only 70 approached VC funds (the other sources 
approached were identified in section 3 and Table 2 above).  Outright rejection 
rates were highest among VC funds (49% rejection), and much higher than that 
for banks (19% outright rejection).  Table 8 addresses in a multivariate context 
whether the factors leading to financing by these distinct sources were 





Table 8. Regression Analyses of Specific Sources of Finance 
Panel A. Bank Finance 
This table presents ordered logit and Heckman corrected ordered logit regression estimates of the extent of external finance obtained from 
different sources.  The dependent variable in Models (1) and (2) is equal to 0 if the source was not approached, 1 if the source was approached but 
no finance offered, 2 if the source was approached but offered less than the full amount, and 3 if the source was approached and offered the full 
amount.  The dependent variable in Model (3) Step 1 is equal to 0 if the source was not approached, and 1 if the source was approached.  The 
dependent variable in Model (3) Step 2 (Models 3A and 3B) is equal to 0 if the source was approached but no finance offered, 1 if the source was 
approached but offered less than the full amount, and 2 if the source was approached and offered the full amount.  The standard logit coefficient 
estimates are presented.  The independent variables are as defined in Table 1.  The total population of firms comprised 1900 UK firms.   
Observations were skipped where there were missing values for the independent variables.   *, **, *** Significant difference for the sample of all 
other firms in the group at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Model 3 
   Model 1  Model 2 




Constant  -1.629*** -1.349 -1.594***  2.183  -7.235 
Firm Financial Characteristics                
Log (Profits)     0.131        1.135* 
Log (Capital Expenditures)  0.113***             
Log (Capital Expenditures / Profits)     0.125***     0.177***  0.149*** 
Innovation -0.023  -0.095  0.122  -0.127  -0.195 
Firm Age and Profile                
Log (Age)     -0.094**        0.020 
Professional Directors              -0.119 
Gender 0.124  0.052  -0.079  -0.004  0.056 
Growth Objectives  0.231***  0.205***  0.375***     0.016 
Corporation     0.178     -0.342*    
Reason Firm Established                
Completely New Start-ups  -0.093  -0.051     -0.241*  -0.322** 
Founded to avoid unemployment of founder(s)     -0.207**        -0.183 
Founded for desire of founder(s) to run own business     0.045        0.112 
Founded to implement an invention     -0.0165        -0.159 
Founded due to wealth ambitions of founders     0.014        0.159 
Ordered Logit Parameters                
µ1 0.179***  0.168***      0.556***  0.584*** 
µ2 0.369***  0.363***      3.374***  3.457*** 
Model Diagnostics          
Number of Observations  1279  1268  1622  374  307 
Loglikelihood -1145.141  -969.581  -972.977  -369.563  -262.426 
Pseudo R
2 0.033  0.040  0.033  0.728  0.567 







Table 8. Regression Analyses of Specific Sources of Finance 
Panel B. Venture Capital Finance 
This table presents ordered logit and Heckman corrected ordered logit regression estimates of the extent of external finance obtained from 
different sources.  The dependent variable in Models (1) and (2) is equal to 0 if the source was not approached, 1 if the source was approached 
but no finance offered, 2 if the source was approached but offered less than the full amount, and 3 if the source was approached and offered 
the full amount.  The dependent variable in Model (3) Step 1 is equal to 0 if the source was not approached, and 1 if the source was 
approached.  The dependent variable in Model (3) Step 2 (Models 3A and 3B) is equal to 0 if the source was approached but no finance 
offered, 1 if the source was approached but offered less than the full amount, and 2 if the source was approached and offered the full amount.  
The standard logit coefficient estimates are presented.  The independent variables are as defined in Table 1.  The total population of firms 
comprised 1900 UK firms.  Observations were skipped where there were missing values for the independent variables.   *, **, *** Significant 
difference for the sample of all other firms in the group at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Model 3 
   Model 1  Model 2 




Constant -3.699***  -8.252  -3.155***  -15.393  -0.774 
Firm Financial Characteristics                
Log (Profits)     -0.048     1.950    
Log (Capital Expenditures)  0.041           0.194* 
Log (Capital Expenditures / Profits)     0.064          
Innovation  0.344**  0.240  0.367***       
Firm Age and Profile                
Log (Age)     -0.181**          
Gender  -0.078  0.105  -0.310       
Growth Objectives  0.504***  0.340**  0.491***       
Corporation     6.191          
Reason Firm Established                
Completely New Start-ups  0.174  0.162          
Founded to avoid unemployment of founder(s)     -0.105          
Founded for desire of founder(s) to run own business     0.164          
Founded to implement an invention     0.279*          
Founded due to wealth ambitions of founders     -0.277          
Ordered Logit Parameters                
µ1 0.313***  0.332***      0.290**  0.262** 
µ2 0.426***  0.449***      2.162***  2.284*** 
Model Diagnostics                
Number of Observations  1279  1080  1622  45  52 
Loglikelihood  -245.990 -196.360 -243.653  -45.905  -50.177 
Pseudo R
2 0.081  0.117  0.085  0.741  0.748 
Chi Squared  43.561***  51.938 45.498***  263.024***  297.983*** 
 
 
The results in Panels A and B of Table 8 indicate there are some similarities 
between banks and VC funds, in that firms with higher capital expenditures and 
growth objectives are more likely to seek and obtain finance from both banks 
and VC funds.  However, the data do indicate three main differences between 
banks and VC funds, and these three differences are consistent with the prior 
literature and the prediction set out in Hypothesis 2b.  First, firms that recently 
developed an innovation are approximately 35% more likely to both seek and 




between innovative activities and capital from banks.  The second main 
difference is that firms that were initially formed as startups are approximately 
30% less likely to obtain their desired finance from a bank.  Note that this is not 
because the startup firm has not tried to obtain capital from a bank; rather, the 
bank was approached but rejected the application because the business was a 
completely new startup organization.  The third main difference is that firms 
with higher capital expenditures / profits are more likely to obtain capital from a 
bank, but not a VC fund.  These results are consistent with VC analyses 
reported in Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2001) that VCs are the “money of 
invention”, but add to the literature by providing data from a broad source of 
entrepreneurial firms that did and did not approach VCs, banks and other 
sources.  As such, the data enable robustness checks for Heckman sample 
selection problems, and enable a comparison of the economic and statistical 
significance across more than 1 type of source of capital. 
 
6. Limitations, Alternative Explanations and Future Research 
 
This paper introduced a very expansive and detailed new dataset which 
significantly extends the literature on the financing decisions of entrepreneurial 
firms.  The data are quite unique in that they are derived from the 
entrepreneurial firms themselves, and not the financial institutions that provided 
the financing.  This enables a broad perspective on which firms seek external 
finance, from which types of institutions that they seek capital, how much is 
asked for, and how much is obtained.  The data enable selection effects in the 
spirit of Heckman (1976, 1979) to be considered in a unique way in the 
literature on entrepreneurial capital sourcing decisions. 
 
The introduction of new data invariably gives rise to questions about sample 
selection and robustness.  However in this case we have a very large sample 
spanning the full size range of small and medium sized entrepreneurial firms 
which is free from response bias in terms of key finance related factors such as 
size age or profitability.  Complete details on survey design and sample 
selection issues are provided in Bullock and Hughes (1998).  In our econometric 
tests we explicitly considered sample selection issues with regard to different 
types of firms applying for external finance among other things.  The robustness 
of our results was explicitly considered.  Additional details regarding the data 
and additional econometric tests are available upon request. 
 
It is noteworthy that our data are derived from a “snapshot” of a cross-section of 
entrepreneurial firms in period leading up to 1997.  The CBR data used here are 
however part of a unique panel data set which tracks the same firms through 




happened to the businesses in subsequent years after they obtained external 
finance.  How was the money spent?  Did some firms fail in subsequent years 
due to the fact that they did not obtain all of their requisite capital?  Did 
obtaining external finance enable the businesses to become more profitable in 
the years subsequent to obtaining external finance?   
 
Our data indicated an absence of a capital gap in that most firms applying for 
external finance were able to obtain their requisite capital.  As such there does 
not appear to be a generic finance gap in the UK entrepreneurial business sector, 
at least in terms of the quantity of external finance available in the market.  
Nevertheless, the ex post analysis of the impact of external finance on 
subsequent entrepreneurial firm performance (which would be post-1997 in our 
data, for example), would shed light on the quality of external finance (in the 
spirit of Storey and Wynarczyk, 1996).  While that type of ex post question 
poses some interesting issues worthy of future data collection efforts, we must 
leave it for future research. 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated the internal versus external financing decisions among a 
very unique dataset comprising 1900 early stage privately held UK firms in 
1996-1997.  We first identified factors that lead firms to seek external finance.  
We found some evidence that firms started to avoid the unemployment of the 
founding entrepreneur, and firms started by females, tended to be less likely to 
seek external finance.  The most robust evidence, however, indicated that more 
profitable firms and firms with stronger growth objectives are much more likely 
to seek external finance. 
 
We then demonstrated the existence of systematic differences in the amount of 
external finance actually sought across businesses.  We found the strongest 
relation between a firm’s capital expenditures / profits and the amount of 
external finance actually sought.  Overall, we view the evidence as providing 
strong support for the traditional pecking order theory which predicts that firms 
prefer to finance new projects internally prior to seeking external capital. 
 
The data also indicated systematic differences in the percentage of external 
finance obtained relative to that sought.  Across all sources of capital, the most 
robust result was that a comparatively larger percentage of external finance was 
obtained by firms with fewer larger competitors (in terms of asset size).   
Considering differences across different types of investors, we also noted that 
banks are less likely to finance completely new startups, while venture capital 




Overall, the data did not indicate the presence of a capital gap in entrepreneurial 
finance; rather, most firms seeking capital are able to secure their requisite 
financing from at least one of the many different available sources.  This 
suggests capital gaps in terms of the quantity of capital available are not 
pronounced in the UK entrepreneurial finance sector.  We did, however, note 
further research examining related questions pertaining to the quality of capital 







1  This work also stems from seminal papers on adverse selection, including 
Ackerlof (1970), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and De Meza and Webb (1987, 
1992).  
 
2 We refer to a firm “approaching” a potential source as making more than a 
trivial effort (for example, it involves more that just mailing in a business plan 
to the potential source for consideration), consistent with our survey evidence 
and related survey work undertaken by the ESRC Center for Business Research 
at the University of Cambridge. 
 
3  There are nevertheless recent surveys of the entrepreneurial finance and 
venture capital literature, including Denis (2004), Gompers and Lerner (2001), 
Smith and Smith (2000) and Berger and Udell (1998), as well as recent surveys 
of the banking literature, including Gorton and Winton (2002) and Berger and 
Humphrey (1997). 
 
4 In a recent theoretical contribution, Chemmanur and Chen (2003) provide a 
seminal analysis on interaction between angel investors and venture capitalists; 
however, no prior paper has empirically tested their model.  In a recent 
empirical contribution, Cassar (2004) focuses on different sources of capital for 
small firms, but does not consider selection effects in the spirit of Heckman 
(1976, 1979), and does not consider the interplay between access to outside 
capital and the development of the entrepreneurial firm. 
 
5   Heckman (1976, 1979) shows that when this incidental truncation is 
accounted for in regression analyses, any or all of the sign, magnitude, and 
statistical significance of regression coefficients may change. 
 
6  For example, as discussed in Garmaise (2000), investors might be more 
skilled in valuing the project than the entrepreneur where the investor has 
experience and market information pertaining to the commercialization of a 
scientific idea, and the entrepreneur’s comparative advantage over the investor 
only lies in the scientific process that led to the idea. 
7 By the term new “start-ups” we mean this is the form of business formation, 
and does not necessarily mean that the firm is especially young.   
8 See 
http://www.bizhelp24.com/business_finance/business_finance_factoring.htm. 
9  The high correlation of 0.65 between turnover and capital expenditures / 
profits causes the sign to reverse in Table 5 for the coefficient on turnover in 






10   The selection corrections for Heckman’s lambda are statistically 
insignificant.  In a few alternative specifications considered the Heckman’s 





Bascha, A., and U. Walz 2001. Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions 
in venture capital finance, Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 285-306. 
Berger, A., and D. B. Humphrey, 1997. Efficiency of financial institutions: 
international survey and directions for future research. European Journal 
of Operational Research 98, 175-212. 
Berger, A., and G. Udell, 1998. The economics of small business finance: the 
roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 613-673. 
Berger, A., L.F. Klapper, and G.F. Udell, 2001. The ability of banks to lend to 
informationally opaque small businesses, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 25, 2127-2167. 
Berger, A. and G.F. Udell, 2002. Small business credit availability and 
relationship lending: the importance of bank organizational structure. 
Economic Journal 112, F32-F53. 
Bergmann, D., and U. Hege, 1998. Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and 
learning. Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 703-735.  
Bierens, H.J., 2003. Modeling fractions.  Research note posted online at: 
http://econ.la.psu.edu/~hbierens/EasyRegTours/FRACTIONS.PDF 
<accessed 1 June 2004> 
Bullock, A. and A. Hughes, 1998. ‘Survey Design, Response Bias and Sample 
Characteristics in the CBR SME Survey’ in Cosh A.D. and Hughes, A. 
(eds) Enterprise Britain :Growth Innovation and Public Policy I the 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprise Sector 1994-1997  Cambridge 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge   
Carpenter, R.E., and B.C. Petersen, 2002. Capital market imperfections, high-
tech investment, and new equity investment, Economic Journal 112 (2), 
F54-72. 
Casamatta, C., 2003. Financing and advising: optimal financial contracts with 
venture capitalists. Journal of Finance 58, 2059 – 2086. 
Casamatta, C. und C. Haritchabalet, 2003. Learning and syndication in venture 





Cassar, G., 2004. The financing of business start-ups. Journal of Business 
Venturing 19, 261-283. 
Chemmanur, T., and Z. Chen, 2002. Angels, venture capitalists, and 
entrepreneurs: a dynamic model of private equity financing, Working 
Paper, Boston College. 
Cosh, A., and A. Hughes, 2003.  Enterprise Challenged.  ESRC Center for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge. 
Cosh, A. and A. Hughes, 1994. ‘Size, financial structure and profitability: UK 
companies in the 1980s.’ In Hughes, A. and D.J. Storey, eds, Finance 
and the small firm. London: Routledge, pp.18-63 
Cressy, R., 1996. Are business startups debt-rationed? Economic Journal 106, 
1253-1270. 
Cressy, R., 2002. Funding gaps: a symposium. Economic Journal 112, F1-F16. 
Cressy, R., and O. Toivanen, 2001. Is there adverse selection in the credit 
market? Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial 
Finance, 3, 215-38. 
Cumming, D. 2004. The determinants of venture capital portfolio size: 
empirical evidence. Journal of Business, forthcoming. 
Denis, D., 2004.  Entrepreneurial finance: an overview of the issues and 
evidence.  Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 301-326. 
Davila, A., G. Foster and M. Gupta, 2003. Venture capital financing and the 
growth of startup firms. Journal of Business Venturing 18, 689-708. 
De Meza, D., 2002. Overlending? Economic Journal, 112, F17-F31. 
De Meza, D., and D.C. Webb, 1987. Too much investment: a problem of 
asymmetric information, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 281-292. 
De Meza, D., and D.C. Webb, 1992. Efficient credit rationing, European 
Economic Review 36, 1277-1290. 
De Meza, D., and D.C. Webb, 1999. Wealth, enterprise and credit policy, 
Economic Journal, 109, 153-163. 
De Meza, D., and D.C. Webb, 2000. Does credit rationing imply insufficient 
lending? Journal of Public Economics 78, 215-234. 
Garmaise, M., 2000. Informed investors and the financing of entrepreneurial 
projects, Working Paper, University of Chicago Graduate School of 
Business. 






Gompers, P.A. and J. Lerner, 2001. The venture capital revolution, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 15, 145-168. 
Gorton, G., and A. Winton, 2002. Financial intermediation.  NBER Working 
Paper # 8928.  Forthcoming in the Handbook of Economics and 
Finance, edited by George Constantinides, Milt Harris and Rene Stulz 
(Amsterdam: North Holland). 
Heckman, J., 1976. The common structure of statistical models of truncation, 
sample selection, and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator 
for such models. Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5, 475-
492. 
Heckman, J., 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 
47, 153-161. 
Hege, U., F. Palomino and A. Schwienbacher, 2003. Determinants of venture 
capital performance: Europe and the United States. Working Paper, HEC 
School of Management. 
Hsu, D., 2003. What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital affiliation? 
Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Jensen, M.C., and W. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, 
agency costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 
305-360. 
Kanniainen, V, and C. Keuschnigg, 2003. The optimal portfolio of start-up 
firms in venture capital finance.  Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 521-
534.  
Kanniainen, V., and C. Keuschnigg, 2004. Start-up investment with scarce 
venture capital support. Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 1935-1959.  
Keuschnigg, C., 2003. Public policy and venture capital backed innovation. 
Working Paper No. 2003-09, University of St. Gallen.  
Keuschnigg, C., 2004a. Venture capital backed growth. Journal of Economic 
Growth 9, 239-261. 
Keuschnigg, C., 2004b. Taxation of a venture capitalist with a portfolio of firms.  
Oxford Economic Papers 56, 285-306.  
Keuschnigg, C., and S.B. Nielsen, 2004. Start-ups, venture capitalists, and the 
capital gains tax.  Journal of Public Economics 88, 1011-1042. 
Kortum, S., and J. Lerner, 2000. Assessing the contribution of venture capital to 
innovation.  
RAND Journal of Economics 31, 647-692. 
Landlier, A., 2002. Start-up financing: from banks to venture capital. Working 





Lockett, A., and M. Wright, 1999. The syndication of private equity: evidence 
from the U.K., Venture Capital: International Journal of Entrepreneurial 
Finance 1, 303 - 324. 
Lockett, A.; M. Wright, 2001. The syndication of venture capital investments, 
Omega: The International Journal of Management Science 29, 375-390. 
Mayer, C., K. Schoors, and Y. Yafeh, 2002. Sources of funds and investment 
strategies of VC funds: evidence from Germany, Isreal, Japan and the 
UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, forthcoming. 
Manigart, S., H. Sapienza, and W. Vermeir, 1996. Venture capital governance 
and value-added in four countries. Journal of Business Venturing 11, 439-
469. 
Maginart, S., K, De Waele, M. Wright, K. Robbie, P. Desbrières, H. Sapienza, 
and A. Beekman, 2000. Venture capital, investment appraisal, and 
accounting information: a comparative study of the US, UK, France, 
Belgium and Holland, European Financial Management 6, 380-404. 
Manigart, S., M. A. Korsgaard, R. Folger, H. Sapienza, and K. Baeyens, 2002a. 
The impact of trust on private equity contracts.  Working Paper, Vlerick 
Leuven Gent Management School. 
Manigart, S., A. Lockett, M. Meuleman, M. Wright, H. Landstrom, H. Bruining, 
P. Desbrieres, U. Hommel, 2002b. Why do European venture capital 
companies syndicate? Working Paper, Vlerick Leuven Gent 
Management School. 
Manigart, S., K. DeWaele, M. Wright, K. Robbie, P. Desbrieres, H.J. Sapienza, 
and A. Beekman (2002c). The determinants of the required returns in 
venture capital investments: a five-country study. Journal of Business 
Venturing 17, 291-312. 
Myers, S.C., 2000.  Outside equity.  Journal of Finance, 55, 1005 - 1037. 
Myers, S.C., and N. Majluf, 1984. Corporate financing and investment 
decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, 
Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-222. 
Myers, S.C., D.A. Dill, A.J. Bautista, 1976. Valuation of financial lease contracts. 
Journal of Finance 31, 799-819. 
Neus, W., and U. Walz, 2004. Exit timing of venture capitalists in the course of 
an initial public offering. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
forthcoming. 
Noe, T.H., and M.J. Rebello, 1996. Asymmetric information, managerial 






Porter, M., 1998. Competitive strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and 
competitors. Free Press. 
Porter, R.H., 1995. The role of information in U.S. offshore oil and gas lease 
auctions, Econometrica 63, 1-27. 
Puhani, P.A., 2000. The Heckman correction for sample selection and its critique, 
Journal of Economic Surveys 14, 53-68. 
Ritter, J.R., and I. Welch, 2002.  A review of IPO activity, pricing and 
allocations. Journal of Finance 57, 1795-1828. 
Smith, R.L., and J.K. Smith, 2000. Entrepreneurial Finance, New York: Wiley. 
Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss, 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information, American Economic Review 73, 393-409. 
Storey, D., and P. Wynarczyk, 1996. The survival and non-survival of small 
firms in the UK. Review of Industrial Organisation 11, 211-229. 
Tamari, M., 1970. The nature of trade credit, Oxford Economic Papers 22, 406-
419. 
Toivanen, O., and R. Cressy, 1999. Lazy entrepreneurs or dominant banks? an 
empirical analysis of the market for SME loans in the U.K., CSME 
Working Paper, Warwick Business School. 
Wong, A., 2004.  Angel finance: the ‘other’ venture capital.  Working paper, 
University of Chicago. 
Wright, M., and A. Lockett, 2003. The structure and management of alliances: 
syndication in the venture capital industry. Journal of Management 
Studies 40, 2073-2104. 
Yusopova, A., 2002. Lease finance development in Russian transition economy. 
Working paper, Novosibirsk State University 